In this paper, we consider social status, the spirit of capitalism, "scal policies, and asset pricing in a stochastic model of growth. With speci"c assumptions on the production technology, preferences, and stochastic shocks, we derive the explicit solutions to the growth rates of consumption and savings and equilibrium returns on all assets. We further demonstrate how "scal policies, the spirit of capitalism, and stochastic shocks a!ect growth, asset pricing, and welfare.
Introduction
In neoclassical growth models wealth accumulation is often taken to be solely driven by one's desire to increase consumption rewards. The representative agent chooses a consumption path to maximize his discounted utility, which is de"ned only on consumption. This motive is important for wealth accumulation. It is, however, not the only motive. Because man is a social animal, he also accumulates wealth to gain prestige, social status, and power in the society; see Frank (1985) , Cole et al. (1992 Cole et al. ( , 1995 , Fershtman and Weiss (1993) , Zou (1994 Zou ( , 1995 , Bakshi and Chen (1996) , and Fershtman et al. (1996) . Earlier contributions include Duesenberry (1948) , Kurz (1968) , and Spence (1974) . In these wealth-is-status models, the representative agent has direct preferences for wealth and accumulates wealth not only for consumption but also for wealthinduced status. Mathematically, in light of the new perspective, the utility function can be de"ned on both consumption, c, and wealth, =: u(c R , = R ). Another interpretation of these models is in line with the spirit of capitalism in the sense of Weber (1958) and Keynes (1971) : capitalists accumulate wealth for the sake of wealth. To cite Weber (1958) :
Man is dominated by making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs. This reversal relationship, so irrational from a naive point of view, is evidently a leading principle of capitalism.
Using the wealth-is-status and the-spirit-of-capitalism models, many authors have tried to explain growth, savings, and asset pricing. Cole et al. (1992) have demonstrated how the presence of social status leads to multiple equilibria in long-run growth. Zou (1994 Zou ( , 1995 has studied the spirit of capitalism and long-run growth and showed that a strong capitalist spirit can lead to unbounded growth of consumption and capital even under the neoclassical assumption of production technology. Bakshi and Chen (1996) have explored empirically the relationship between the spirit of capitalism and stock market pricing and o!ered an attempt towards the resolution of the equity premium puzzle in Mehra and Prescott (1985) . They have shown that when investors care about status they will be more conservative in risk taking and more frugal in consumption spending. Furthermore, stock prices tend to be more volatile with the presence of the spirit of capitalism.
On the other hand, Eaton (1981) , Turnovsky (1993 Turnovsky ( , 1995 , Grinols and Turnovsky (1993, 1994) , and Obstfeld (1994) have introduced stochastic tax and stochastic government expenditure into the continuous-time growth and assetpricing models. Under speci"c assumptions on the production technology, preferences, and stochastic shocks, they have derived explicit solutions to the growth rates of consumption and savings and equilibrium returns on assets. But these continuous-time stochastic growth models have not explicitly considered the role of social status and the spirit of capitalism in capital accumulation, asset pricing, and growth.
In this paper, we integrate these two trends of growth and asset-pricing literature and consider social status, "scal policies, and asset pricing in a stochastic model of growth. With speci"c assumptions on the production technology, preferences, and stochastic shocks, we derive the explicit solutions to the growth rates of consumption and savings and equilibrium returns on all assets. We further demonstrate how "scal policies, social status, the spirit of capitalism, and stochastic shocks a!ect economic growth and asset pricing.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present a modi"ed growth and asset-pricing framework as in Turnovsky (1995) and Bakshi and Chen (1996) . In Section 3, we derive the optimal conditions for macroeconomic equilibrium. In Section 4, using a speci"c utility function, we present explicit solutions to the consumption}wealth ratio, the mean growth rate of the economy, and the expected real return on bonds and capital. In Section 5, we discuss the e!ects of stochastic shocks and "scal policies on the economy. In Section 6, we discuss the e!ects of the concern for social status or the spirit of capitalism on asset pricing and growth. We conclude the paper in Section 7.
The model
Along with Eaton (1981) and Turnovsky (1995) , we assume output > and government expenditure G to be proportional to the mean-level output, i.e.
Eq.
(1) asserts that the accumulated #ow of output over the period (t, t#dt), given by the right-hand side of this equation, consists of two components. The deterministic component is described as the "rst term on the right hand, which is the "rm's production technology and has been speci"ed as a linear production function. The second part is the stochastic component, which can be viewed as the shock to the production and assumed to be temporally independent, normally distributed, and
In Eq. (2), the deterministic part of government expenditure is expressed in terms of a fraction of mean output, and government expenditure has the stochastic shock dz. It is further assumed that dz is temporally independent, normally distributed, and
Following Turnovsky (1995) , it is assumed that there are two assets in the economy: government bonds, B, and the capital stock, K. If the in#ation rate is stochastic as in Fischer (1975) , the return on government bonds B will also follow a stochastic process. Without providing much detail on the derivations, it is postulated, as in Turnovsky (1995) that the stochastic real rate of return on bonds, dR , over a period dt, is given by
where r and du will be determined endogenously in the macroeconomic equilibrium.
Turning to the second asset, capital, and using the production technology in Eq. (1), the stochastic real rate of return on capital is
Thus, wealth =(t) is the sum of the holdings of B(t) and K(t), i.e.,
=(t)"B(t)#K(t).
Let n and n ) denote the fractions of wealth invested in bonds and capital, respectively, i.e., n " B(t)
and n #n ) "1. We may assume that, without any loss of generality, taxes are levied on capital income and consumption, namely,
where , are the tax rates on the deterministic component of capital income and the stochastic capital income, respectively, and A is the tax rate on consumption. The introduction of a consumption tax into the model is new. As shown later, consumption tax impacts on economic growth in the wealth-isstatus or the spirit-of-capitalism model. In the traditional setup with the utility de"ned only on consumption, a consumption tax has no long-run e!ect on growth and wealth accumulation, it only crowds out private consumption. Now, the representative agent chooses the consumption}wealth ratio, c/=, and the portfolio shares, n and n ) , to maximize his expected utility subject to the budget constraint, i.e.,
where is the time discount rate. The initial stocks of bonds and capital are given by B(0) and K(0), respectively. In addition,
The inclusion of total wealth as an argument in the utility function has been done in many deterministic models mentioned in our introductory section, and its presence in a stochastic model appears only in Bakshi and Chen (1996) in the context of stock-market pricing. But recently Turnovsky (1995) , Grinols (1996) , and Grinols and Turnovsky (1996) have included real balances (or liquidity services), which are a component of wealth, in the utility function in their studies of "scal and especially monetary policies in stochastic models. Since we will consider a real economy here, real balances are not in the picture. It is natural to extend the model to a monetary economy and take real balances as a part of total wealth. This is clearly a direction for further research. It will be interesting to compare the results obtained here with the ones with money.
Macroeconomic equilibrium
As in Turnovsky (1995) , the economic system in equilibrium determines the rates of consumption and savings, the value of returns on all assets, and the economic growth rate.
The exogenous variables include the preference parameters, technology parameters, and government "scal policies including government expenditure g, tax rates , , and A . The exogenous stochastic processes consist of government expenditure, dz, and productivity shocks, dy, which are taken to be mutually uncorrelated. The remaining stochastic disturbances * real rates of returns on bonds, du , and total wealth, dw, are both endogenous and will be determined by the economic system. The remaining endogenous variables include the following: the consumption}wealth ratio, c/=, the mean growth rate of the economy, the expected real returns on two assets, r , and r ) , respectively, and the corresponding portfolio shares n and n ) . To solve the agent's optimization problem, we introduce the value function
subject to (6) and (7). De"ne
<(=, t)"e\@RX(=, t).
Proposition 3.1. The xrst-order conditions for the optimization problem can be written as follows:
where is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the portfolio selection constraint (7). Furthermore, the optimal solutions of the problem must satisfy the Bellman equation
where "n r #n ) (1! )r ) , and it is the expected net-of-tax return on total asset holdings.
See the details of the proof in Appendix A. Condition (9) asserts that in the equilibrium the marginal utility of consumption must equal the marginal utility of wealth; conditions (10) and (11) are the asset pricing relationships; condition (12) is the portfolio selection constraint; and Eq. (13) is the Bellman equation, from which we will solve the value function X(=, t).
In order to determine the full equilibrium system, we follow Turnovsky (1995) in discussing government behavior. Eqs. (2) and (5) describe government expenditure policy and tax policies, both of which are proportional to current output. In the absence of lump-sum taxation, government budget constraint can be described as dB"B dR #dG!d¹.
From (2) and (5), this can be written in the form
For the equilibrium in the product market, we have
where G follows the stochastic process of Eq. (2). Now, we have Proposition 3.2. The equilibrium system of the economy can be summarized as
and the transversality condition (TVC) plus the initial conditions. Furthermore, Proposition 3.3. The stochastic component of real rate of return on bonds, du , and total wealth, dw, are determined by
Proof. Using the intertemporal constancy of portfolio shares we have
i.e., all the real assets grow at a common stochastic rate. Combining with Eqs. (6), (15), (17), and (20), we get
From the equations above, and noticing the fact n #n ) "1, it is easy to get dw and du . ᮀ These two equations enable us to compute all the necessary covariances and variances in the full equilibrium system. Eq. (19) implies that the stochastic shocks of government expenditure and production determine the stochastic rate of return on government bonds.
An explicit example
In order to "nd explicit solutions, we specify the utility function as in Bakshi and Chen (1996) 
where '0, and 50 when 51, and (0 otherwise; " " measures the investor's concern with his social status or measures his spirit of capitalism. The larger the parameter " ", the stronger the agent's spirit of capitalism or concern for social status. Under the form of the utility function in (21), we have Proposition 4.1. The xrst-order optimal conditions are
where is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with constraint (7),
dw"n du #n )
Eq. (9) gives the consumption}wealth ratio. For a logarithmic utility function in consumption, i.e., "1, we get c/=" : the consumption}wealth ratio is equal to the time discount rate. If O1, then the e!ect of an increase in the expected net-of-tax return on the consumption}wealth ratio will be
Therefore, an increase in the expected net-of-tax return will raise the consumption}wealth ratio if '1, and lower it otherwise. This can be explained as follows. When '1, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/ , is relatively small. The representative agent will increase current consumption more than investment and wealth. On the other hand, when (1, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is relatively large, and the agent will increase wealth holding more than consumption. Similar analysis holds for the e!ect of the variance of wealth, U , on c/=:
Therefore, an increase in the variance of wealth reduces the consumption}wealth ratio when (1, and increases the ratio when '1. Eqs. (10) and (11) illustrate the asset pricing relationships. The term of / (1! ! )=\A\H can be regarded as &risk-free' return in this all risky world * both returns on bonds and capital are uncertain. Eq. (10) implies that the return on bonds is equal to the &risk-free' return plus a risk premium, which is proportional to the covariance between total wealth and risky bonds. Similarly, in Eq. (11), for the net return on the risky capital, it is also equal to the &risk-free' return plus a risk premium, which is proportional to the covariance between total wealth and risky capital.
Since is still endogenous in terms of holding shares for the two assets, we now use the full equilibrium system to derive explicit solutions to c/=, n , n ) , r , and . With Proposition 3.3, and from the optimal conditions (10) and (11) plus Eq. (15), we have 
The "rst term on the right-hand side of Eq. (25) is the net (after-tax) return on capital, which is the same as in Turnovsky (1995) ; the second term on the right-hand side is the stochastic component of the return on bonds.
With Proposition 4.2, we now have our main theorem of this section:
Theorem 4.3. The explicit solutions of the economic system are
n "1!n )
and the TVC
Proof. Notice the conditions
We obtain
Thus, we have Eqs. (27) and (28). With Eq. (17), we have
and Eq. (29).
Using Eqs. (25), (26), and the portfolio-selection constraint n #n ) "1, we have Eq. (30). ᮀ Please also note that the transversality condition (31) can be shown to be equivalent to c/='0. In fact, since d="= dt#= dw, we have
The TVC will be met if and only if
By Eq. (27), we have
Eq. (32) is just the condition for a positive consumption}wealth ratio.
Comparative dynamics
Now, we discuss how stochastic shocks (in production and government spending) and government "scal policies a!ect the equilibrium.
Ewects of stochastic shocks
Di!erentiating with respect to X and W , respectively, in Eq. (27), we have for '1,
Therefore, when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is relatively small, a higher variance in government expenditure increases the consumption}wealth ratio, whereas the stochastic shock in production lowers the consumption} wealth ratio. On the other hand, when (1, we have just the opposite results, namely,
From Eq. (28), the equilibrium growth rate, , varies with the stochastic shocks of government spending as follows. For all values of ,
because ( # )'0. Therefore, more volatility in government spending always increases the rate of economic growth. This is true because an increase in X raises the risk of bonds. The agent reduces his holding of government bonds and invests more in capital, which in turn leads to more output growth.
But for the shocks to the productivity, the mean growth rate of the economy can increase or decrease depending on the values of and other parameters. For example, when '1, and (50%,
In this case, an increase in the variance of the productivity shocks lowers the growth rate. But when (1, */* W has an ambiguous sign. Our results con"rm the complicated pictures of the e!ects of stochastic shocks on output growth in Obstfeld (1994) , Turnovsky (1995) , and Grinols and Turnovsky (1996) .
The dependence of the shares of asset holding on the stochastic shocks can be derived from Eq. (29):
The "rst equation above tells us that the stochastic shock in government expenditure will enhance the holding of risky capital. In the second equation the e!ect of the stochastic shock in production on the holding of risky capital is ambiguous.
We have derived the value function X(=, t) in Appendix B. Let =(0) denote the initial stock of wealth. We have the following welfare function:
However, =(0) is itself endogenously determined by
. Therefore, with some simple manipulations, welfare is given by
where c/= and n ) are determined as in Theorem 1. Taking di!erentiation in Eq. (35), we get
Now, we have
These equations imply that the e!ects on welfare of the stochastic shocks in government expenditure and production are ambiguous.
Ewects of xscal policies
Now, we turn to how taxes on capital income and consumption impact on the equilibrium.
First, di!erentiating all endogenous variables with respect to the tax on the deterministic part of capital income, , in Eqs. (27)} (29), we have
If "1, c/= is independent of the tax rate, because in this case c/=" , which is independent of . When 0( (1, we notice that a rise in the taxation on the deterministic component of capital income has an ambiguous e!ect on welfare. But, it is clear that
Therefore, a higher tax on the deterministic component of capital income will increase the consumption}wealth ratio and decrease the economic growth rate. This can be explained as follows: a higher tax on capital income will lower the return on capital. As the agent switches away from capital to bonds and consumption, this reduces capital accumulation, lowers the growth rate, and increases the consumption}wealth ratio. When '1, we still "nd that capital income taxation reduces the holding share of risky capital and lowers the growth rate
But it reduces the consumption}wealth ratio:
Second, we look at the e!ects on the equilibrium of the tax on the stochastic component of capital income:
These results are very similar to the ones for the tax on the deterministic component of capital income. Still,
when 0( (1; and
when '1. From the analysis above, the relationship between income taxes and growth is similar to the one in Turnovsky (1995) : Raising the tax rate on the stochastic component of capital income has the opposite e!ect to raising the tax rate on the deterministic component of income.
Finally, we examine the e!ects of the consumption tax on the equilibrium. Recall that from the Ramsey}Cass}Koopmans model, the consumption tax does not a!ect the rate of economic growth and long-run capital accumulation. In the long run, it only crowds out private consumption. Here we have
That is to say, increasing the consumption tax will reduce the consumption}wealth ratio because a higher consumption tax decreases private consumption directly, and the agent has more money to invest in capital and bonds, which in turn increases wealth. Therefore, the consumption}wealth ratio decreases as a result of a higher consumption tax.
For the growth rate, a rise in the consumption tax results in
Hence, */* A (0 when '1; and */* A '0 when 0( (1. Because when '1, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is small, and the agent is less willing to sacri"ce current consumption for future consumption. Therefore, the cut in investment is more than the cut in current consumption, which leads to a lower long-run growth rate. On the other hand, when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is relatively large (i.e. 0( (1), the agent is more willing to give up current consumption for investment in risky capital. As a result, a higher consumption tax leads to a higher growth rate.
As for welfare, we have
Therefore, *X/* A (0 when '1. The explanation is simple. Since the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is small, current consumption will not be severely cut as a result of a consumption tax, whereas current investment in assets is reduced. In the long run, the agent will accumulate less assets and earn less income. His consumption and asset holdings are all reduced in the long run. Since welfare is de"ned on both consumption and wealth accumulation, his long-run welfare is also lower. For (1, the welfare e!ect of a consumption tax is ambiguous because the direct e!ect of a higher consumption tax reduces consumption. But with a larger elasticity of intertemporal substitution the agent may increase his asset holdings, which in turn can lead to more asset accumulation and more income. This rising income can give rise to more long-run consumption. Again since the agent's welfare is de"ned on both consumption and asset holdings, his welfare may also rise in this case.
E4ects of the spirit of capitalism
In this section, we will discuss how the spirit of capitalism or the concern for social status a!ects asset pricing and economic growth. For simplicity, we set consumption tax, A , to zero in this section. First, we give the equilibrium asset}pricing relationships. Following Turnovsky (1995), we de"ne the market portfolio as Q"n =#n ) =, and the return rate on the market portfolio as
Now we have
Proposition 6.1. The equilibrium asset}pricing relationships are
where i"B, K,
and using Proposition 4.1, we get the result. ᮀ Again / (1! ! )=\A\H can be regarded as the risk-free return. Eq. (42) indicates that the returns on risky assets (government bonds and capital) are given by the familiar consumption-based capital asset pricing model with r / as the return on the market portfolio.
Furthermore, if we de"ne the return on the market portfolio in the absence of the spirit of capitalism as r / , then, in our de"nition of the return of the market portfolio r / , we set "0. Hence,
This is just the return on the market portfolio in Turnovsky (1995) . At the same time, we have
Hence, we obtain the asset-pricing relationships as
Because r / (r / , simple calculations yield
Eq. (43) implies that, with the spirit of capitalism, the gap between the returns on risky assets and the return on the risk-free asset will be enlarged. Like Bakshi and Chen (1996) , our "ndings can be used to partially explain the equity premium puzzle in Mehra and Prescott (1985) . For the growth rate, social welfare, and portfolio selection, we have Proposition 6.2. The ewects of the spirit of capitalism on c/=, n ) , , and X are as follows:
If '1, we have '0. Then
Similarly, if (1, we have (0. In this case " " measures the spirit of capitalism, and
Therefore, an increase in the spirit of capitalism will always increase the growth rate and the holding share of risky capital. With a strong spirit of capitalism, the agent cares more about his social status and the power of wealth, and will accumulate more wealth and take more risk in investment in order to improve his social status. If we further impose the condition that (
when '1 and '0. Furthermore, with the same condition on the tax rate on the stochastic component of capital income, i.e., (
when (1 and (0. Given the assumption on the tax rate, a strong spirit of capitalism always reduces the consumption}wealth ratio. Since the agent's utility is de"ned on both consumption and wealth accumulation, his long-run welfare rises as a result of higher wealth and possibly even higher consumption.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have extended the existing frameworks of stochastic growth and asset pricing by including the spirit of capitalism and concern for social status * direct preferences for wealth. In this extended model, we have studied how stochastic shocks in production and government spending a!ect consumption, wealth accumulation, economic growth, and welfare. This paper has further extended the studies by Eaton, Grinols, Obstfeld, and Turnovsky, among others, to consider the impact of various taxes on the consumption} wealth ratio, growth, and welfare. The existence of the positive e!ect of a consumption tax on growth is a result of the spirit-of-capitalism or wealth-is-status model. Without the spirit of capitalism, a consumption tax has no e!ect on output growth.
The direct e!ect of the spirit of capitalism on the economy has been also explicitly considered in this paper. It is shown that the existence of the spirit of capitalism can better explain the di!erence between the rates of return on government bonds and risky stock * the Mehra}Prescott risk-premium puzzle. In the spirit-of-capitalism or wealth-is-status model, the gap between the returns on risky assets and the risk-free asset is always larger. Furthermore, a higher spirit of capitalism or a stronger concern for social status can lead to higher output growth, more holdings of risky capital, and a lower consumption}wealth ratio.
This research can be extended in many directions. The discussion of monetary policy is a natural choice when wealth includes bonds, capital, and real balances. The results can be compared to the ones in Turnovsky (1995) , Grinols (1996) , Turnovsky and Grinols (1996) where only real balances are included in the utility function. Another interesting extension is to examine the optimal (welfare-maximizing) choices of capital income taxes and consumption tax following Corsetti (1992 Corsetti ( , 1997 , Turnovsky (1995) , and Turnovsky and Grinols (1996) . To solve the problem, we de"ne the value function <(=, t) <(=, t)"e\@RX (=, t) and formally, it is also de"neḑ 5 (<(=, t))" *< (B.9)
